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Private insurance for long‐term care has all but collapsed. Major private insurers have
dropped their long‐term care lines, or watched them fail.1 Existing policies have been subject to
shocking premium rate increases.2 Insureds face two‐ or three‐fold premium increases, just to
keep policies active that they have funded for decades. Even active, coverage often pays for
only a slice of the care that they need.
Scholars have acknowledged that turning the private market around would be a heavy
lift. The recent study in this issue by Jalayne J. Arias, Ana M. Tyler, Benjamin J. Oster, and Jason
Karlawish provides more evidence on shortcomings of private long‐term care insurance,4 and
reinforces the need to focus on social insurance solutions.
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The Arias study highlights a great irony: with 5.5 million people currently living with
Alzheimer’s and an expected 14 million by 2050, getting private long‐term care insurance to
cover their care needs is only becoming harder. As the authors describe, most people with
Alzheimer’s and other diseases that cause dementia are intensive users of long‐term services
and supports—assistance with non‐medical needs necessary for daily life, such as help bathing,
eating, or paying bills. Yet, medical researchers increasing ability to identify who is at the most
risk of developing symptomatic Alzheimer’s, by identifying biomarkers of the disease, will make
it impossible for those very people to insure privately for future care needs.
The study illuminates that state law—based on a model act developed by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners—allows private insurers to use biomarker data in
underwriting decisions, including a decision not to offer coverage at all.5 This means that an
insurer can consider someone’s elevated risk for Alzheimer’s in an application for a long‐term
care policy, which will undoubtedly lead to rejection.
Their findings illuminate critical flaws in the private market for long‐term care insurance.
First, private insurers profit by excluding those people most in need of coverage, unless
regulation prohibits it. Their profit motive is contrary to larger social goals of financial and
health security for people at risk of Alzheimer’s. Second, insurance is primarily regulated at the
state level, which means a state could prohibit insurers from using biomarkers in underwriting
(this is the primary solution the study’s authors recommend). Yet, to make such protections
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universal would require every state to regulate, or for Congress to step in and pass a law that
applies to all states. If the law prohibited insurers from considering biomarkers, but people
knew their own, those people who are most likely to need insurance will disproportionately buy
it (adverse selection), and prices would increase beyond their currently unaffordable levels.
Third, these types of consumer protections laws are a moving target. Today, it’s biomarkers.
Tomorrow, it’s new medical advances that the current law did not imagine. As medicine
innovates, so will insurance underwriting practices to exclude risky applicants in any way
possible.
It has become abundantly clear that the only way to create adequate insurance for long‐
term care is through a universal social insurance program. Some point to the repeal of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s social insurance program for long‐term care, the
CLASS Act, as evidence that social insurance cannot work. To the contrary, its failure, based on
actuarial flaws and the ability of people to opt out, highlights the importance of mandatory,
universal coverage, like the coverage most peer nations have embraced in developing long‐
term care social policy.6
The reasons for the lack of social insurance for long‐term care in the United States are
multifaceted, but at least one reason is a failure to consider the full social impact of the
problem. Social policies and private insurance for long‐term care have conceived of risk of long‐
term care too narrowly, from the perspective of those people needing care. 7
The problem become more acute if we consider risk from the perspective of family
members and friends who may become responsible for someone in need of long‐term care—
what I elsewhere call “next‐friend” risk.8 By one estimate, the financial losses alone—including
forgone income, pensions, benefits, and retirement savings—sustained by the average informal
caregiver who leaves the workforce to care for her parent are $300,000.9 Two‐thirds of informal
caregivers are women and over one‐third leave the workforce or reduce working hours.10
Informal caregivers also face significant physical and mental health risks.11
This level of financial and health risk can destroy a family’s long‐term security. It looks
like the level and type of risk that historically has motivated popular and political support for
social insurance. The risks are random, unevenly distributed, and potentially devastating and
are passed from one generation to the next, creating intergenerational insecurity.
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Instead of seeing these costs as risks that could be managed collectively, long‐term care
has been cast as something families can and should manage—in part because they do, in
homes and out of the public eye. Yet long‐term care as a private obligation is increasingly
untenable. The actual care needs of people with chronic illness and disability are becoming
more intensive, as the Arias study shows. At the same time, families and friends are less able to
address these needs. Single‐parent families and two wage‐earner households are the new
normal, leaving little cushion to absorb caregiving.12 Families have dispersed geographically.13
And the ratio of people needing care to those who can provide it is increasing as people live
longer and have fewer kids.14
Families will face increasing insecurity from next‐friend risk with the rise in Alzheimer’s
and related diseases that demand intensive care for many years. By seeing the costs friends and
family have borne as evidence of an insurable risk and pursing policies that are more sensitive
to this risk, we can protect people from severe insecurity that arises out of the tragic
misfortune of having a loved one become ill or disabled.
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